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1. Introduction 
 
Whether the economic globalization homogenizes the world economy or differentiates it? 
The globalization has influenced economic growth in the world, especially in developing 
countries. Therefore, many studies have discussed its influence on growth of developing 
countries not only in economics but also in various branches of social sciences (Ritzer, 
2010). 
 When we look at growth of developing countries from the viewpoint of 
international economics, it has been recognized that growth depends on technology 
diffusion from developed countries to developing countries through international 
activities, such as trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). That is, if technologies 
diffuse, then developing countries can grow, however, if do not, then they cannot 
(Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Young, 1991). Therefore, 
it means that technological homogenization between developed and developing countries 
is a growth condition in developing countries. 
 However, looking at actual growth, we can find that firms in developing 
countries have been growing though remaining technology gaps. The fact can be seen in 
diversification of boundaries of local firms in China’s cell phone industry (Kimura, 2006, 
2010, 2011b). Boundaries of the firm mean make-or-buy choices of each stage or 
component on value chains (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990). On a 
value chain of cell phones (development, manufacturing, sales stages), foreign firms in 
the Chinese market, such as Nokia, Motorola, Samsung, and so on, develop new types of 
products by themselves. On the other hand, Chinese local firms tend to outsource the 
development stage to outside independent design houses, however integrate a part of the 
sales stage through establishing own sales networks. 
A reason to outsource the development stage is that local firms face a 
disadvantage of technology deficit. Because they do not have enough experiences or 
learning effect for product development through learning-by-doing (LBD) due to 
latecomers, so they have to cost much more money and time to develop new types than 
foreign firms. Consequently, average costs of products developed by local firms could be 
higher than those by foreign firms. Therefore, outsourcing is a rational choice for local 
firms. On the other hand, a reason to integrate a part of the sales stage is that they have a 
home advantage as local firms in the Chinese market. Because the sales stage strongly 
relates to human element, so they have the home advantage to find reliable distribution 
partners, control sales staff, and understand demand trends and business customs in China. 
1 
 
As a result, they have offset the technological disadvantage by the home advantage and 
expanded their market share in the Chinese growing market of cell phones. 
 In this way, the diversification is brought by the disadvantage and the advantage. 
Not only in China’s cell phone industry, this characteristic is shared with other 
manufacturing industries in China (Marukawa, 1996, 2007; Ohara, 1998, 2000; Shanghai 
Caijing University Ketizu, 2006). Therefore, we generalize the case as a simple model. To 
do it, the model of boundary selection developed by Antràs and Helpman (2004) and 
Antràs (2005) is used here. They modeled multi-nationalization of firms in developed 
countries through make-or-buy choices of manufacturing in home (developed countries) 
or abroad (developing countries). Therefore, we incorporate characteristics of firms in 
developing and home countries to consider the case of China’s cell phone industry. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: In the next section, the 
model is set up. After that, entry conditions are analyzed in Section 3. Findings are 
presented in the concluding section. 
 
 
2. Model 
 
An economy in which there exists a developed country (North) and a developing one 
(South) is considered relative to Antràs and Helpman (2004) and Antràs (2005). Suppose 
that there is a North firm N and a South one S in each country and that both firms are 
competing in a market in the South. The North firm exports or invests in the South and 
enters the South market.1 In addition, suppose that both firms input only labor and 
produce goods for final goods y. 
 Consumers have a simple demand function for the final goods as follows: 
 
ݕ ൌ  ߣ ݌ିଵ/ሺଵିఈሻ, 0 ൏ ߙ ൏ 1,
 
 is the price of the final goods, and α is price elasticity of demand. λ > 0 is a coefficient 
f firms are then set. Suppose that both firms run businesses by 
mbini
                                                       
                     (1) 
p
given exogenously. 
 Behaviors o
co ng a headquarters service xh and a technology service xt. The headquarters service 
indicates various activities for manufacturing and selling final goods. The technology 
 
1 It is assumed that there is no difference in entry between modes, export, or investment. 
2 
 
service indicates product development. The headquarters service is provided only by 
assemblers of the final goods both in the North and South. The technology service is 
provided by the North firm which produces the final goods in the North and by the South 
firm or an independent supplier in the South. The North firm makes the technology 
service by itself, and the South firm may make the technology service by integrating 
suppliers, or it outsource them from independent suppliers rather than integrating them. 
Optimal selections of make-or-buy of the technology service for the South firm are 
analyzed under certain situations in the next section. 
 
2.1. Behavior of the North Firm 
he North firm produces the technology service by itself. Therefore, two inputs, xh and xt, 
ݕ ൌ ߪ௭ ݔ௛
ଵି௭ ݔ௧௭, 0 ൏ ݖ ൏ 1,                      (2) 
 
z is elasticity of production of the technology service. σz = 
dustry becomes a technology service-intensive industry when z > 1/2. It becomes a 
௧
ఈ௭. 
When it bears a wage rate wN in the North to produce every unit of production, the North 
firm chooses xh and xt to maximize a profit function as follows: 
here b >1 is an away disadvantage. As discussed in the previous section firms in home 
markets have the home advantage, therefore we introduce the away disadvantage to 
express the advantage of the South firm. 
 not make the technology service by itself from 
 
T
are combined based on a Cobb-Douglas production function producing the final goods: 
 
z-z (1-z)-(1-z). The final goods 
in
headquarters service-intensive one when z < 1/2. The following revenue function of the 
North firm RN may be derived from Eqs. (1) and (2): 
 
ܴே ൌ ߣଵିఈ ߪ௭ఈ ݔ௛
ఈሺଵି௭ሻ ݔ
 
 
ߨே ൌ ߣଵିఈ ߪ௭ఈ ݔ௛
ఈሺଵି௭ሻ ݔ௧
ఈ௭ െ ܽݓேݔ௛ െ ݓேݔ௧                (3) 
 
w
 
2.2. Behavior of the South Firm 
 
Unlike in the North, the South firm does
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the first. Therefore the South firm makes a decision of boundary selection k ∈ (M, B) as 
uys B. If the firm follows the Grossman-Hart-Moore 
odel, the South firm will integrate a supplier and make xt by itself in order to avoid a 
ain which each side can receive when negotiations fail. When 
to whether the firm makes M or b
m
hold-up problem when the firm needs to invest in human capital for xt to increase the 
value of final goods. 
 Next, the influence βk ∈ (0, 1) on gains between the South firm and a supplier is 
explained. On shares between these two entities, suppose that both sides can receive gains 
of each outside option and half of the rest, based on the Nash bargaining solution. The 
outside option is a g
bargaining fails in cases where the South firm buys xt (that is, does not integrate a 
supplier), the outside option of the south firm for the technology service is zero. On the 
other hand, even when bargaining fails in cases where the south firm makes the 
technology service, the firm can receive δ as an outside option. Suppose 0 < δ < 1. Then 
the south firm which integrates the technology service can keep δα against sales. In the 
case that the south firm makes xt, the share is RS and is the total amount of sales in the 
South. This shows that the supplier has become a part of firms in the South as a 
department of production of the technology service. Consequently, their shares decrease 
more than in existence as an independent firm.2 When firms in the South buy xt, the 
supplier can keep the outside opportunity of the technology service as an independent 
firm. In summary, the relation between both sides is as follows: 
 
ߚெ ൌ ߜఈ ൅
ଵ
ଶ
ሺ1 െ ߜఈሻ ൐ ଵ
ଶ
ሺ1 െ ߜఈሻ ൌ ߚ஻. 
 
 While the above is based on a general mechanism of boundary selection, the 
influence of technology gaps to the mechanism can be connected. It can be assumed that 
technology levels required to produce the technology service are high due to 
chnological difficulties of production of core components for the final goods and 
                                                       
te
transfer from North to South. Therefore the South firm needs to accumulate experiences 
to master the technology by itself. In first using the technology, productivity of the South 
firm is lower than that of the North firm because of the lack of experiences. Hence, even 
 
2 In this article, the relation between firms in the South and suppliers is based on the relation between 
firms manufacturing low-technology goods and firms manufacturing high-technology goods, as in 
Antràs (2005). He also supposes that low-tech and high-tech firms receive half after (excluding 
outside opportunity) respectively. 
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if the South firm integrates the supplier to improve the quality of the core component, it 
cannot receive the effects of human capital investment in as much an amount as does the 
North firm. Consequently, it can be assumed that the average cost in the South becomes 
higher by bk > 1 when the South firm makes a choice to produce the technology service 
by itself, where wN > wS. Therefore, while the wage rate in the South is lower than that in 
the North (depending on the degree of technology gaps), the labor cost in the South 
possibly exceeds that of the North. 
 Hence, the South firm’s and the supplier’s revenues are, respectively, as follows:  
 
௙ܴ
ௌ ൌ ߚ௞ ߣଵିఈ ߪ௭ఈ ݔ௛
ఈሺଵି௭ሻ ݔ௧
ఈ௭,                        (4) 
ܴ௦ௌ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߚ௞ሻ ߣଵିఈ ߪ௭ఈ ݔ௛
ఈሺଵି௭ሻ ݔ௧
ఈ௭.                      
hen the South firm makes the technology service, the supplier receives the above 
revenue as a department of the South firm. Moreover, the South firm’s and the supplier’s 
profits are, respectively, as follows:  
 
ߨ௙
ௌ ൌ ߚ௞ ߣଵିఈ ߪ௭ఈ ݔ௛
ఈሺଵି௭ሻ ݔ௧
ఈ௭ െ ܾ௞ݓ ௛
ߨ௦ௌ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߚ௞ሻ ߣଵିఈ ߪ௭ఈ ݔ௛
ఈሺଵି௭ሻ ݔ௧
ఈ௭ െ ݓௌݔ௧.                
 department of the South firm. In addition, it can be 
ssumed that the supplier also employs workers at lower wage rates than those in the 
North firm because the South firm and the supplier locate in the South despite integration 
or disintegration by the South firm. 
 
 
. Equilibrium 
ice for the North firm is as follows:  
݌ே ൌ
ܽଵି௭ݓே
ߙ
 
W
ௌݔ ,                (5) 
 
It is also the same in profit. When the South firm makes the technology service, the 
supplier receives the above profit as a
a
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In this section, optimal prices for the North and the South firms from the profit functions 
in the previous section are developed, and boundary selection of the South firm is 
analyzed. Possibilities of softening of an entry condition are also considered. 
 From Eq. (3), the optimal pr
 
.                                                                        ሺ6ሻ 
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The price depends on the wage rate and price elasticity of demand in the North. 
 Next, from Eq. (5), the optimal price for the South firm is as follows:3 
 
݌ௌሺߚ ሻ ൌ
ܾ௞
ଵି௭ݓௌ
௞ ߙߚ௞
ଵି௭ሺ1 െ ߚ௞ሻ௭
.                                               ሺ7ሻ 
 
The North firm does not need to make a decision regarding boundary selection. Hence the 
ptimal price depends on the wage rate in the North. On the other hand, the South firm is 
hen must 
hoose β rice when 
 chooses integration. 
 First consider influences of z on boundaries selection k ∈ (M, B). The South firm 
chooses βk to minimize the optimal price under a certain z. Looking at βk in Eq. (7), the 
outh firm can be seen to minimize the optimal price when it chooses the smaller βk if z is 
the South firm’s investment becomes bigger than the supplier’s 
o
required to choose boundaries minimizing the optimal price. The South firm t
c k depending on z and consider an influence of bM > 1 on the optimal p
it
S
bigger, and conversely, the larger one if smaller. In cases where the industry is a 
technology service-intensive one, the supplier’s investment in human capital becomes 
bigger than the South firm’s because significance of the core component to the value of 
the product is higher. On the other hand, in cases where the industry is a headquarters 
service-intensive one, 
because the significance of the headquarters service to the value of the product is higher. 
Buying is the optimal boundary in cases of the technology service intensive-industries; 
making is optimal in cases of headquarters service-intensive industries. 
 Next, entry conditions faced by the South firm may be set based on optimal 
prices. It is assumed here that North and South firms compete in the South market under a 
Bertrand competition.4 Consequently, the South firm’s optimal price should be lower than 
that of the North because rational consumers do not intend to buy homogenous goods at 
                                                        
3 Differentiating the profit function of the South firm with respect to headquarter service xh, results in 
an optimal amount of that profit. Similarly, differentiating the profit function of the South firm with 
respect to technology service xt, results in an optimal amount of profit. Substitute
the South firm and the supplier and solve for xh and xt. When these optimal amou
 these derivatives of 
nts are substituted 
into the price function p = λ1-ασα-1x (α-1)(1-z)x (α-1)z derived from Eqs. (1) and (2), Eq. (7) results. 
. 
h t
4 If a Cournot model of competition is assumed, then optimal boundary selection based on differences 
of optimal production volume depending on technology level of firms in the South can be considered. 
However, this article focuses on entry conditions and whether or not firms in the South can enter in 
comparison with the cost level of firms in the North and South. This is considered based on a Bertrand 
competition model considering comparison between prices of firms in the North and the South
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higher prices. It would not be realistic to expect that both North and South firms, that is, 
firms in developed and developing countries, make homogenous goods and compete in 
the same market together because the South firm tends to avert competition with the 
North firm directly in the same market. However, to consider influences of existences of 
the North firm on the South firm’s boundary selection explicitly, competition between 
both the North and the South firms may be assumed. Then, under the Bertrand 
competition, the entry condition becomes pN / pS > 1. Therefore, the following condition 
from Eqs. (6) and (7) arises: 
 
߱ ൒ ܣሺߚ௞ሻ                             (8) 
 
where ω and A(βk) are defined as follows: 
߱ ؠ
ݓே
ݓௌ
 
 
ܾ௞
ଵି௭
௭ߚ௞
ଵି௭ሺ1 െ ߚ௞ሻ௭
ܣሺߚ௞ሻ ؠ ܽଵି
 
Thus, the South firm must choose boundaries in which A(βk) is equal to or smaller than 
ω. Depending on circumstances, the South firm may not be able to set boundaries or enter 
into markets. 
 
.1. Technology Service-Intensive Industry 
ve industry can be considered. Depending on the extent of the wage ratio ω, 
e firm may decide to run business by purchasing the core component or not to enter 
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Based on the entry condition, the South firm’s boundaries selection in a technology 
service-intensi
th
business at all. The condition is as follows: 
߱ ൌ
1
ܽଵି௭ߚ஻
ଵି௭ሺ1 െ ߚ஻ሻ௭
.                                                           ሺ9ሻ 
 
 
As shown in Eq. (9), in the industry the South firm chooses to buy, aB = 1. The South firm 
does not need to bear a cost increase of production brought by making on its own. 
However, βB < 1/2 and 1/2 < z < 1; therefore the right side of Eq. (9) is larger than 1 
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depending on b. Therefore, depending on ω and b, the firm may decide to enter through 
purchasing or not to enter. Even if the right side of Eq. (9) becomes larger than 1, the 
outh firm can enter through buying if the wage ratio is large enough to compensate for 
it.5 On the other hand, if the ratio is not large enough, then the firm cannot enter at all. 
 
.2. Headquarters Service-Intensive Industry 
he 
age ratio ω is getting bigger when the productivity disparity bM is getting bigger. As 
f b’M, then the wage ratio must be more 
an the level of ω’. This is the condition for the South firm to integrate the supplier. 
 
 When the South firm has to bear excessive costs, bM, even if integration is 
optimal, then there is a possibility that the South firm can clear the entry condition by 
choosing to buy. Because the South firm has to bear bM > 1, even if integration (βM > 1/2) 
                                                       
S
3
 
The South firm’s boundary selections in the headquarters service-intensive industry are 
considered next. The firm chooses among making, buying (despite the fact that making is 
an optimal selection) and non-entry depending on the wage ratio ω and bk. This condition 
is seen in Eq. (8). Even if the industry is the headquarters service-intensive, the firm is 
required to choose boundaries in consideration of the burden of bM > 1 to make by itself. 
This situation is described in Fig. 1. The South firm cannot clear the entry condition if t
w
shown in the figure, if bM is at the same level o
th
 
Fig. 1: Relation between A(βM) and bM 
 
 
5 According to Rattner (2011), the per-hour wage at factories of GM in 2009 was 55 dollars in US, 7 
in Mexico, 4.50 in China, and 1 dollar in India. Hence, even productivity in emerging countries is 
lower than that in US, the wage differences can compensate the productivity differences. 
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is optimal in the headquarters service-intensive industry (z < 1/2), the South firm can 
decrease bM to bB = 1 by choosing to buy (βB < 1/2). Consequently, when A(βM) < ω, the 
South firm can clear the entry condition. The new entry condition is similar to that in Eq. 
(9). However, A(βM) gets bigger in comparison with boundary selection which is optimal 
for choosing to buy because the South firm chooses βB < 1/2 despite the fact that z < 1/2. 
When the South firm cannot clear the new “compromising” condition, then the firm 
chooses non-entry. 
 However, if the South firm can use the home advantage, on the other hand, the 
North firm faces the away disadvantage, the entry conditions can be mitigated by a1-z. 
Therefore, the South firm can increase possibilities to entry and grow, depends on the 
dvantage. 
outh firm can clear the condition for entry. 
 it cannot be covered by the wage ratio, the South firm cannot clear the entry 
ondition. However, there is a possibility that it can enter by switching from making to 
uying the technology service. In addition, if the South firm can use the home advantage, 
ditions can be mitigated. 
Except for the case where the South firm is making the technology service in a 
 North and the South 
a
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This article has shown that firm boundaries in developing countries are likely to be 
diversified. In first considering the case that the final goods for consumption are from a 
technology service-intensive industry, the optimal boundaries for the South firm are that 
it buys the technology service from an independent supplier. The South firm then does 
not need to bear the increase of average cost due to integration. If only the wage ratio 
offsets inefficiency, the S
 Considering the case of a headquarters service-intensive industry, making of the 
technology service in-house is the optimal boundary selection for the South firm. They 
must take on the increase in cost burden due to technology gaps. If the increase becomes 
so large that
c
b
then the entry con
 
headquarters service-intensive industry, the South firm’s boundaries are differentiated 
from those of the North firm. Specifically, a South firm can be seen to exert the home 
advantage in its South market. There is a possibility that firm boundaries in developing 
countries can become diversified in each developing country to exert the home advantage 
of each. 
 Finally, in the case of homogenization of boundary-levels of
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fi revious studies have assumed that boundaries become homogenized when 
technologies differ, and this was confirmed by research in this article. If the cost increase 
due to technology gaps is small when the South firm makes the technology service (that 
is, if technologies diffuse enough), then the South firm can be expected to choose similar 
boundaries to those of the North firm and can catch up. If the North firm has already 
chosen optimal boundaries, and it is not difficult for the South firm to follow the model, it 
is a rational decision for the South to choose
rms, p
 similar boundaries of the North firm because 
ffset technology gaps. 
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